Internet Shutdowns in Belarus: The 2020–2026 Record

Table

What is an internet shutdown and how does it fit into internet censorship in Belarus?
Timeline of internet shutdowns in Belarus, 2020–2026
The infrastructure that makes shutdowns possible
August 2020: the 61-hour election blackout
Legal tools: website blocking, Belarus Resolution 476 and individual disconnection
2026: mobile-data throttling reported
How to tell if your connection is being restricted
Primary sources to verify shutdowns
Why Belarus differs from Russia on internet shutdowns
Frequently asked questions about internet shutdowns in Belarus
Sources

Internet access in Belarus has been disrupted repeatedly since August 2020. That month the authorities imposed a nationwide shutdown lasting about 61 hours during presidential-election protests. More recent measures include targeted disconnections of individuals under Resolution 476 (2025) and mobile-data throttling reported in 2026.

What is an internet shutdown and how does it fit into internet censorship in Belarus?

Internet censorship in Belarus has never been limited to website blocks; it also includes the ability to slow or stop connectivity itself. An internet shutdown is a state-ordered restriction, total or partial, of access to the internet or mobile data. In Belarus, the authorities have used shutdowns at moments of political pressure. The August 2020 blackout left most users without normal connectivity for about 61 hours. Resolution 476 extended the same logic to named persons in 2025. Freedom House's Freedom on the Net 2024 country report treats these restrictions as part of the country's digital control system.

Timeline of internet shutdowns in Belarus, 2020–2026

Date	Duration / scope	Measure	Primary source
9–12 August 2020	About 61 hours; nationwide; access severely restricted, with only 2G service reported in many areas	Nationwide internet shutdown during the presidential-election protests	Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024; NetBlocks
2021	Localised and intermittent	Disruptions affecting specific areas and periods	Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024
2025	Individual level	Resolution 476 allows state bodies to restrict a person's internet and phone services without court order	CSOMETER, citing Resolution 476 and article 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code
2026	Mobile networks	Mobile-data throttling and speed reductions reported; full independent confirmation pending as of November 2026	Monitoring reports; institutional sources cited by digital-rights monitors

The infrastructure that makes shutdowns possible

The state-controlled telecommunications system includes the National Traffic Exchange Centre and the State Telecommunications Inspectorate. These bodies can act as choke points for blocking and monitoring traffic; Freedom House describes them as part of the legal and technical architecture for internet control. The same infrastructure allows the authorities to degrade service selectively rather than cutting the entire country. That makes disruptions harder to detect and easier to deny. This selective capability is part of how far state digital surveillance reaches. Belstat and DataReportal country data document widespread mobile and fixed connectivity, so even partial restrictions affect everyday communication, banking and news access.

August 2020: the 61-hour election blackout

The Belarus 2020 internet shutdown was the most extensive documented episode in this record. From 9 to 12 August 2020, internet access was severely restricted across Belarus. Freedom House's Freedom on the Net 2024 report records that the blackout lasted about 61 hours. Many users were reduced to 2G connectivity; images, streaming and most secure applications became unusable. NetBlocks independently measured the disruption and corroborated the national scope. The shutdown followed the presidential election of 9 August 2020 and the protests that followed. The United States Department of State condemned the shutdown in a joint statement dated 17 September 2020. It linked the blackout to a wider pattern of repression. The blackout sits within a longer timeline of political repression from 2020 to 2025.

Legal tools: website blocking, Belarus Resolution 476 and individual disconnection

Website blocking without a court order has been available to the authorities since December 2014. According to figures cited by CSOMETER and Freedom House, about 15,000 sites were blocked and roughly 7,000 were classified as "extremist". In 2025, Resolution 476 added a more precise tool: state bodies may restrict an individual's internet and phone services. Article 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code is cited alongside it as the legal basis for disconnection without court order. The practical effect is that a person can lose connectivity without a prior judicial decision. Digital-rights monitors link that change to a growing capacity for selective punishment.

Legal instrument	Since	Scope	Primary source
Website blocking without court order	December 2014	Nationwide blocking; about 15,000 sites blocked, about 7,000 classified as "extremist"	CSOMETER / Freedom House
Resolution 476	2025	Individual internet and phone access restriction without court order	CSOMETER
Article 199, Criminal Procedure Code	Cited with Resolution 476	Individual disconnection	CSOMETER

Independent media have been under siege in 2025, making regular reporting on the implementation of these powers difficult.

2026: mobile-data throttling reported

In 2026, reports described mobile-data throttling in Belarus: users remained connected but experienced reduced speeds or capped data volumes. This differs from a full shutdown because basic messaging may continue while video, uploads and secure applications become slow or unusable. No decree or technical order confirming the Belarus mobile data capping 2026 episode had been published as of November 2026. The reports were attributed to institutional sources, and independent confirmation remained partial. Network measurement groups classify such slowdowns as a form of internet disruption rather than a complete blackout.

How to tell if your connection is being restricted

Loss of 4G or LTE coverage, with devices falling back to 2G or EDGE.
HTTPS pages, VPN connections or messaging apps failing while basic browsing still works.
Upload speeds dropping sharply or DNS failures on specific sites.
Total loss of connectivity in a defined area without a general network outage reported by mobile operators.

Readers who need a diagnosis can follow NetBlocks measurements and operator notices. Beyond diagnosis, the separate guide on how activists protect themselves online explains the wider safeguards used by Belarusian users.

Primary sources to verify shutdowns

Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2024 country report: documents the 2020 blackout, 2021 localised disruptions and platform blocking.
NetBlocks: independent network measurement of the 2020 disruption and slowdown reports.
U.S. Department of State, joint statement of 17 September 2020: diplomatic record of the election blackout.
CSOMETER: note on Resolution 476 and article 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Why Belarus differs from Russia on internet shutdowns

Carnegie Politika has argued that Belarus has not built the same kind of permanent national filtering infrastructure as Russia. It relies instead on targeted blocking and legal tools. Freedom House, however, records that Belarusian authorities have the technical capability to impose dramatic restrictions at politically sensitive moments. The result is a distinct pattern: shorter, event-driven shutdowns and selective individual measures rather than continuous nationwide censorship. Even under throttling, a new generation of Belarusian resistance continues to organise online.

Frequently asked questions about internet shutdowns in Belarus

Does Belarus still impose internet shutdowns now?

As of November 2026, no nationwide blackout is documented, but mobile-data throttling and individual access restrictions under Resolution 476 are reported.